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Abstract

This paper considers the recipient value and distributional impact of the
Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (CSHC) by analysing a range of
possible behavioural responses to economic incentives. First, I estimate the
recipient value by considering the trade‐off between moral hazard and risk
pooling. The utility gain through risk‐pooling is found to be negligible. The
deadweight loss through moral hazard may be considerable. I also use
illustrative models to demonstrate the possible effects of the CSHC on
savings and labour supply. Whilst the CSHC may induce some people to
save and work more, it may have the opposite effect on others.
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I Introduction
Retirement income policy is becoming increasingly important as structural ageing effects the
population of almost all developed countries (OECD, 2007). At the same time, Australia’s system of
compulsory retirement saving is maturing. For the foreseeable future, most people will continue to
receive at least some public pension income in retirement. Nevertheless, it is expected that older
people will become increasingly affluent (Australian Government, 2007a: Chart C6). The Australian
government has pursued a range of policies which aim to support and encourage ‘self‐funded
retirees’.
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Paradoxically, this increasing support implies that these people are not entirely self‐

funded. The effects of these policies warrant evaluation, as do their costs.
The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (CSHC) is one of the main components of this policy suite. It
provides noncash benefits, particularly a concession price for pharmaceuticals through the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). It also provides eligibility for cash benefits, conditional on
residency requirements. The aims of this paper are to estimate the value of the CSHC to recipients
and to consider its possible distributional effects. In doing so, it considers a range of behavioural
responses. It considers the trade‐off between moral hazard and risk pooling associated with the PBS
concession. It also presents illustrative models of the incentives it provides to savings decisions and
labour supply both before and during the age of eligibility for the CSHC.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews previous Australian studies on
the distributional impact of noncash government benefits. Section III gives a detailed description of
the CSHC. It considers changes to its eligibility rules and the increasingly generous set of benefits to
which holders are entitled. It also provides a profile of CSHC holders. The recipient value of the PBS
component of the CSHC is estimated in Section IV using two complementary models which
respectively address the trade‐off between risk pooling and moral hazard. The issue of externalities
is also discussed. The distributional impact of the CSHC is addressed in Section V. Consideration is
given to behavioural responses in the realms of labour supply and saving. Taxation and general
equilibrium issues are discussed. The main feature of this section is an illustrative inter‐temporal
model of the effect of the CSHC on people’s saving behaviour as they approach retirement. Section
VI concludes and provides a summary of the paper.
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The term ‘self‐funded retiree’, now commonplace in Australian policy discourse, has no formal definition.

However, in typical usage, it excludes anyone who receives any pension income. (see for example
Commonwealth of Australia, 1999; Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2001). This population is the
subject of the analysis in this paper.
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II Previous Australian Studies
There have been no previous attempts to measure the distributional impact of the CSHC. However,
the last 25 years have seen a stream of research on the impact of noncash government benefits
(especially health care) on the distribution of economic well‐being. In Australia, the role of noncash
benefits (the ‘social wage’) is of particular interest in the historical context of the ACCORD
agreement between the Labor government and the trade union movement in the 1980s. The
ACCORD coincided with the re‐introduction of universal public health insurance known as Medicare
(Quiggin, 1998). The number of Australian studies is substantial and growing (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2007; Economic Planning Advisory Council, 1987; Harding, 1984,
1995; Johnson et al., 1995; Johnson, 1998; Norris, 1985; Raskall and Urquhart, 1994). Many of these
studies considered health benefits alongside other benefits such as education, housing and in some
cases also public goods such as defence and roads. Australia was also included in a several
comparative international studies (Garfinkel et al., 2006; Marical et al., 2006; Smeeding et al., 1993;
Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995).
A second group of studies has focussed on specific health programs. These improve on those listed
above primarily through their increasingly sophisticated statistical disaggregation of benefits
amongst the population. These include analyses of the public hospital system (Schofield, 2000) and
the PBS (Brown et al., 2005; Harding et al., 2004; Schofield, 1998).
In each of these twenty studies, public health insurance is valued at the cost of provision to
government. In doing so, they implicitly or explicitly assume perfectly inelastic demand for health
care and no utility gain from risk pooling. 3 They also assume no externalities. I discuss these issues
further in Section IV.
In all but three of these studies, the distributional impact (sometimes referred to as the
‘redistributive impact’) is estimated by comparing the distribution of cash income to that of a
broader measure of income which includes cash income plus the value of benefits (and in some
cases also subtracting the value of taxes). In doing so, they assume perfectly inelastic labour supply
and no inter‐temporal substitution. 4 The three exceptions are Schofield (2000), Johnson (1998) and
Johnson, Manning and Hellwig (1995), who do not attempt to measure the distributional impact.
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Alternatively, it could be argued that they implicitly assume that the utility gain from risk pooling is exactly

offset by the utility loss from moral hazard. This trade‐off is addressed further in Section IV.
4

These issues are discussed at length in Section V.
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As often mentioned by the authors, these studies may be useful starting points in assessing the
distributional impact of government programs. However, if insufficient attention is given to their
limitations, they also have the potential to be misleading.
Several U.S. studies (most by Timothy Smeeding) address some of the issues that the Australian
studies have avoided. These include attempts to account for the distortionary effect of noncash
benefits on consumption, attempts to value externalities and to account for differences in
efficiencies between public and private sectors. These are discussed when relevant in the sections
that follow.

III The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card
The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (CSHC) was introduced in July 1994. Its original purpose
was to provide pharmaceuticals at a concessional price to people of age pension age who met the
pension income eligibility test, but who did not meet other eligibility conditions. The majority of
such people did not meet the assets test or residency requirements. In April 1997 there were only
37,844 CSHC holders (Table 1) (Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, 1997). The
concessional price for pharmaceuticals listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) was
$2.60 per prescription at the time. Other people eligible for the concession include pensioners and
low income earners. Consumers who were ineligible for the pension paid $16.00 per prescription.
For both general and concessional consumers, the price is reduced after a consumer exceeds a given
annual out‐pocket expenditure in a calendar year, as shall be discussed subsequently.
In January 1999, there was a fundamental change in the role of the CSHC. The CSHC income
eligibility threshold was no longer linked to that of the age pension eligibility threshold. It was almost
doubled to $40,000 per annum for singles and $67,000 for couples. Officially, the 1999 CSHC policy
change was designed to ‘encourage people to save for their own retirement’. (Costello, 1998: 5) The
threshold was increased again nominally in July 2000 and more substantially in July 2001, to $50,000
for singles and $80,000 for couples (Australian Government, 2007b: Section 4.10.7.50). Immediately
before the last of these threshold increases (June 2001), there were 226, 140 CSHC holders.
(Department of Family and Community Services, 2003a). Two years after the last increase (June
2003) there were 282,691 CSHC holders (Table 1) (Department of Family and Community Services,
2003b). The exact number of people who took‐up the card as a result of the income threshold
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reforms is unknown. 5 Recall that the 37,844 CSHC holders in 1997 were all below the age pension
income eligibility threshold. If this number was to stay constant over time, then perhaps 87% of
CSHC holders in 2003 had become eligible due to the increase in the threshold. 6 This is a very rough
approximation, but it suggests that most CSHC holders may have become eligible due to the
reforms.

Table 1 Number of CSHC Holders
April 1997

37,844

June 2001

226,140

June 2003

282,691

June 2004*

287,326

June 2005

300,165

June 2006

310,633

June 2007*

318,278

Notes: It is presumed that these are at June as for the other years, though this is not stated in the original
source. Source: Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs (1997) and FaCS/FaCSIA Annual Reports
in various years.

Prior to September 2001, the PBS concession was the only benefit of the CSHC. Since then, there has
been a number of additional cash benefits introduced which are linked to CSHC eligibility. From
September 2001, CSHC holders who meet residency requirement are also eligible for the Telephone
Allowance. This is a cash benefit initially worth $72 per year (paid quarterly) for people who have a
telephone connected in their name or their partner's name. This has increased incrementally to
$85.60 by December 2006. Age pensioners are also eligible for the Telephone Allowance.

5

As will be shown below, the income distribution of CSHC holders is available at one point in time, using the

Household Expenditure Survey (HES) of 2003‐04. These data could be used to estimate the proportion of
recipients whose income falls between the old and new thresholds. However, this may be misleading because
of the application of CSHC income eligibility rules. Applicants meet the CSHC income eligibility test if their
income in the previous financial year was below the threshold. However, applicants can also meet the income
test on the basis of an estimate of income in the current financial year, if they can demonstrate a change in
circumstances since the end of the previous financial year.
6

This estimate becomes 86% if it is assumed that this number increased in proportion with the age pension

age population (taking into account the increase in the age eligibility threshold for women from 60.5 to 62
years between 1997 and 2003).
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From December 2004, CSHC holders who meet residency requirements are entitled to the Seniors
Concession Allowance, a cash benefit initially worth $200 per year (paid in two instalments). This has
increased incrementally to $214 by December 2006. Age pensioners are not eligible for this benefit.
However, age pensioners are eligible for various concessions from State and Territory governments
for services such as property and water rates, energy bills, public transport and motor vehicle
registration, many of which are not available to CSHC holders. Indeed the Seniors Concession
Allowance was introduced because of such concessions.
In turn, the Seniors Concession Allowance has provided eligibility for two ‘one‐off’ payments. In June
2007, a payment of $500 was made to Seniors Concession Allowees as well as to age pensioners. In
June 2006, a one‐off payment of $102.80 was made to Seniors Concession Allowees. The same
payment was made to age pensioners. Notably, however, age pensioners who were members of a
couple (not separated due to illness) only received half of this amount each, whilst coupled Seniors
Concession Allowees each received the full amount. Non‐concession card holders were not eligible
for these payments. It is also notable that a similar payment (worth $300) was made in 2001 to age
pensioners, but not to CSHC holders.
CSHC holders might also be more likely to be bulk‐billed 7 for GP services than non‐concessional
patients. In February 2004, the Commonwealth Government introduced financial incentives for GPs
to bulk‐bill concession card holders and children aged under 16. However, there does not seem to be
any available data that quantifies the extent to which CSHC holders are actually bulk‐billed.
From March 2004, CSHC holders are entitled to concessional coverage under the extended Medicare
Safety Net. Under this scheme, 80% of non‐hospital out‐of‐pocket medical expenses are reimbursed
by the government after such expenditure exceeds a given threshold. In 2007, this threshold is
$519.50 per year for concession card holders, and $1039 for non‐concession card holders. Thus the
additional concessional coverage is worth a maximum of 80%

($1039‐$519.50) = $415.60 per year

per recipient. Data on the distribution of annual out‐of‐pocket medical expenses of CSHC holders are
not available, and so the average value of this concession to CSHC holders is unknown. However, the
average annual out‐of‐pocket expenditure by CSHC holders is estimated to be $257 in 2003‐04, and
the proportion exceeding $519.50 is no more than 11%. 8 Furthermore, both concession card holders
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Bulk‐billing is a billing system which includes no charge for the patient.

8

Authors calculations from the 2003‐04 ABS Household Expenditure Survey Expanded Confidentialised Unit

Record File. Expenditure in this data set is recorded on a household basis. Household expenditure is assumed
to be equally distributed between household members. Respondents are asked to recall expenditure on
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and general patients are also eligible for the (original) Medicare Safety Net. Under this scheme,
100% of the Medicare Schedule Fee is reimbursed for patients whose ‘gap’ fees exceed an annual
threshold. The gap is the difference between the Medicare Schedule Fee and the amount
reimbursed by Medicare. The gap is equal to 15% of the Schedule Fee, although practitioners are
free to charge in excess of the Schedule Fee. In 2007, the threshold for this scheme is $358.90.
Without access to relevant data, the interaction between the original and extended Medicare Safety
Nets is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, it is clear that the average value of this scheme to CSHC
holders (in excess of its value to non concessional patients) is likely to be small. An upper bound is
calculated as the maximum benefit multiplied by the maximum proportion of beneficiaries =
$415.60

11% = $45.72. The actual value may be considerably smaller than this.

Table 2 summarises the non‐PBS benefits received by each CSHC card holder in 2007. The total is
$799.60 for 2007 plus the unmeasured values of additional bulk billing and the concessional
threshold in the Medicare Safety Net. Older people without concession cards are not eligible for any
of these benefits. Age pensioners are eligible for all of these benefits except for the Seniors
Concession Allowance.

Table 2 Summary of nonPBS CSHC benefits per card holder in 2007
Telephone Allowance
Seniors Concession Allowance
One‐off Payment
Additional Bulk Billing
Medicare Safety Net (concessional threshold)
Total

$85.60
$214.00
$500.00
value unknown
value unknown*
$799.60

* The value is estimated to be no greater than $45.72, but could be considerably less than this. Due to the lack
of confidence in this estimate, it has been excluded from the calculations that follow.

medical services over the previous three months. The distribution of annual expenditure cannot be derived
from these data. The variance of expenditure is likely to be greater for a short recall period than a long recall
period. However, an upper bound of the proportion of people exceeding the threshold can be derived by
assuming that the three‐month recall period is representative of the full year for each household. Under this
assumption, 11.0% of CSHC holders exceeded the $519.50 threshold. Thus a maximum of 11.0% of CSHC
receive any benefit from the Medicare Safety Net. Similarly, no more than 8% exceed the $1039 threshold,
hence benefitting from the maximum value of the concession.
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The 2003‐04 Household Expenditure Survey is perhaps the only nationally representative data set
available which explicitly identifies CSHC holders. Table 3 shows summary statistics for CSHC holders,
with comparisons to non‐CSHC holders of age pension age and to younger people (including
children). Approximately 10% of older people were CSHC holders. On average, CSHC holders were
one year younger than non‐CSHC holders of age pension age and a slightly larger percentage (2%)
was male. Their average equivalised current disposable income was considerably higher ($102 per
week) than that of non‐CSHC holders of age pension age, but considerably lower ($78) than that of
younger people. 9 A comparison of annual income reveals similar relativities. CSHC holders are
located throughout the income distribution, although relatively few are in the top quintile. In
comparison, non‐CHSC holders of age pension age are concentrated in the bottom half of the
distribution.
Whilst CSHC holders appear to fare poorly relative to younger people on these income measures, it
is noted that cash income is not a good metric for comparisons of living standards between older
people and younger people. This is due to the exclusion of imputed rental income from owner
occupied housing, which greatly benefits older people relative to younger people (see Saunders and
Siminski, 2005; Yates, 1991). This is reflected in the last row of Table 3, which shows that 88% of
CSHC holders live in an owner‐occupied dwelling without a mortgage, compared with 77% of non‐
CSHC holders of age pension age and just 23% of younger people.

9

Specifically, the income measure is person‐weighted equivalised income, using the ‘modified‐OECD’

equivalence scale. The equivalence scale adjusts for differences in need due to household composition.
Person‐weighting ensures that all people (including children) are included in the summary statistics. The
method assumes pooling of income within households.
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics from HES 200304

CSHC holders

non‐CSHC
holders of
age pension
age

younger
people*

264,438
56.1%
71.7

2,312,571
57.8%
72.9

17,011,496
49.0%
34.9

mean equivalised disposable current
income ($ / week)

493.07

390.75

570.81

mean equivalised disposable annual
income $ / year

28,172

21,877

35,875

% in each decile of equivalised disposable
current income
1st decile (low)
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile (high)
Owner occupied dwelling (outright)

17.5%
6.2%
8.4%
12.3%
12.8%
10.5%
8.2%
11.3%
5.7%
7.0%
88.0%

18.4%
27.3%
19.7%
10.1%
8.2%
5.1%
3.2%
1.9%
2.7%
3.4%
77.1%

8.8%
7.8%
8.9%
9.9%
10.2%
10.6%
11.0%
11.0%
11.0%
10.9%
22.9%

number of people
sex (% female)
mean age

Source: Author’s calculations from from the 2003‐04 ABS Household Expenditure Survey Expanded
Confidentialised Unit Record File.
* All people (including children) who are below age pension age (males under 65 years and females under 63
years).

IV The TradeOff Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard: Recipient
Value
As discussed above, the CSHC provides a reduced price for PBS pharmaceuticals, which can be seen
as a form of public health insurance. The aim of this section is to measure the average value of this
benefit to recipients.
It is well understood that health insurance involves a trade‐off between risk‐pooling and moral
hazard (Manning and Marquis, 1996; Pauly, 1968). Health insurance reduces the risk of high health
expenditure. The avoidance of risk is valued by a risk averse actor. But health insurance also reduces
the marginal price of health care, which may lead consumers to purchase a higher quantity of health
care than they would otherwise. Manning & Marquis (1996) attempt to measure the optimal level of
9

coinsurance (0% coinsurance = full insurance; 100% coinsurance = no insurance) to maximise utility
given this trade‐off using data from the RAND health insurance experiment. They demonstrate that
there are three variables determining the optimal level of co‐insurance:
•

The price elasticity of demand for health care

•

The level of risk aversion

•

The degree of uncertainty over future health care consumption

The RAND experiment enabled them to estimate the price elasticity of demand for health care. This
parameter facilitates the measurement of the dead weight loss attributable to moral hazard. The
RAND experiment also enabled an estimate of risk aversion, using a stated preference approach. At
the end of the experiment, respondents were asked to choose (hypothetically) between insurance
plans at varying prices. The degree of uncertainty was also estimated: respondents were asked to
estimate their expenditure for the following period, and this was compared to their actual
expenditure.

In the Australian distributional literature, no attempts have been made to incorporate either moral
hazard or the value of risk‐pooling. In the early US distributional literature, some attempts were
made to account for moral hazard, but not the value of risk pooling (Smeeding, 1977; Smeeding and
Moon, 1980; Smeeding, 1982, 1984; Smolensky et al., 1977). However, none of these studies
incorporated the insights of the economic literature on insurance. They treated $X of health
insurance as $X of health care. Thus they did not consider the utility value of insurance given risk
aversion, nor did they explicitly consider moral hazard.

There is a small and relatively new literature that considers the insurance value of Medicare in the
USA (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2005; McClellan and Skinner, 1997). Both studies draw on the
introduction of Medicare in 1965 as a natural experiment and find the insurance value to be
substantial and larger than the welfare loss of moral hazard.

In this remainder of this section I estimate the utility gain from risk pooling and the dead weight loss
associated with moral hazard for the CSHC. In doing so, I estimate the value of the PBS concession to
CSHC holders. Following Manning and Marquis (1996), I measure these effects in two stages. Unlike
Manning and Marquis, I do not compare the CSHC to a no‐insurance counterfactual. I compare the
benefits of the CSHC to the less generous ‘general’ level of pharmaceutical cover provided by the
PBS. Under the ‘general’ scheme, consumers are already covered against high levels of
10

pharmaceutical expenditure, so it is not surprising that the additional reduction in risk provided by
the CSHC is negligible. On the other hand, the deadweight loss due to moral hazard is not negligible
and is likely to vary considerably between individuals. The key parameters that drive this variation
are the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals and preferences for pharmaceutical versus
non‐pharmaceutical consumption (which will partially be driven by health status).

Risk Pooling
In this subsection I estimate the utility gain associated with risk pooling in the CSHC, based on the
method of Finkelstein and McKnight (2005). Assume that the price of pharmaceuticals (p) is fixed.
For a given individual, let demand for pharmaceuticals (xi) be a function of health status (hi over
which there is uncertainty) and their preference for pharmaceutical consumption versus non‐
pharmaceutical consumption (which is fixed for each given consumer and is hence ignorable). Thus xi
= fi(hi). In this model, the only source of variation in xi for a given individual is health status. Poorer
health leads to higher xi. Thus it is assumed that utility is derived from non‐pharmaceutical
consumption only. Let income be denoted I. Let y denote the composite good of non‐pharmaceutical
consumption. The price of y is normalised to 1. Income is equal to total consumption, so that I = px +
y. Assume that the utility function is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function:
1− ρ

Ui =

( I − pxi )1− ρi
yi i
= i
1 − ρi
1 − ρi

where ρ is the risk aversion parameter. The CRRA utility function provides analytical simplicity. It
assumes that risk aversion is negatively proportional to wealth (or consumption) (Pratt, 1964).
Many available estimates of ρ are in respect to utility as a function of wealth and so are not relevant
here (see Hartley et al., 2006 for a review of such estimates; and Meyer and Meyer, 2005 for a
formal discussion of the relationship between CRRA utility functions of wealth and consumption).
Estimates of ρ in respect to utility as a function of consumption include 4.1 in a study based on
hypothetical gambles over permanent changes to income (Barsky et al., 1997). That study also found
very little variation in this estimate by income quintile, supporting the assumption of CRRA for
consumption. There have been several other studies which exploit savings responses to interest
rates to measure the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, which in turn is the inverse of ρ. These
estimates for ρ include 2.5 (Engen, 1993; cited by Engen and Gruber, 2001) and between 2 and 5
(Skinner, 1985). The consistency of these estimates justify the ‘long line of simulation literature’
described by Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) which takes ρ to be 3. In the present study, I follow
Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) by assuming that ρ is equal to equal 3, and testing sensitivity to
11

values of 1 and 5. It is acknowledged that all of the estimates reviewed above are with respect to the
USA. To the author’s knowledge, corresponding estimates do not exist for Australia.
To implement this approach, it is necessary to estimate the extent of uncertainty over future health
status and/or health consumption. Whilst x is a random variable, it may not be completely random.
In particular, health status is likely to be serially correlated. Several approaches have been used in
the literature to address this issue. In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, participants were
asked to predict future health care consumption. Manning and Marquis (1996) compared these
responses to actual consumption, thus measuring the extent to which it was predicted. Finkelstein
and McKnight (2005) modelled the distribution of health care consumption before and after the
introduction of the Medicare scheme in the United States.
The data to implement such approaches for the CSHC are not available. In fact, the annual
distribution of pharmaceutical expenditure is not readily available for even one point in time for the
population of interest. 10 However, this is not a major limitation. The approach taken here is to make
conservative assumptions over the distribution of out of pocket health care expenditure and the
extent of uncertainty over future consumption. Despite these assumptions, the utility value of the
CSHC due to risk‐pooling is found to be small or even negligible.
Health care consumption is assumed to be completely random, regardless of prior health status or
other observable characteristics. This approach will overestimate the uncertainty over future health
care consumption (and hence the utility value of risk pooling). Following Siminski (2008), the annual
number of PBS pharmaceutical prescriptions consumed is assumed to follow an overdispersed count
data process, with a mean of 33.1. The extent of overdispersion is unknown, but is parameterised
through a Negative Binomial process (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998: equation (3.26) for the density
function). Figure 1 shows three such distributions. The first is the Poisson distribution, which is a
special case of the Negative Binomial with the overdispersion parameter (α) equal to zero. This is
also almost identical to a Normal distribution. The other distributions are Negative Binomial with α
set to 0.3, and 1 respectively. When α = 1, the variance of the Negative Binomial is 34 times larger
than that of the Poisson.

10

HES 2003‐04 includes self‐reported household expenditure on prescription medication in a two‐week period.

The distribution of this amount is unlikely to be a useful proxy for the shape of the annual distribution for at
least two reasons. The variance of expenditure in two‐week recall period is likely to be much greater than that
of annual expenditure. Secondly, not all prescription medications are listed on the PBS. Patients would pay the
full cost of any such medications, thereby increasing the variance further.
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Figure 1 Possible distributions for annual number of PBS drug purchases

Note: these are hypothetical distributions of the number of PBS drug purchases, assuming it follows a count
data process with a mean of 33.1 (see text).

Each of these distributions of prescription counts implies a distribution of pharmaceutical
expenditure under general and concessional price schedules. Recall that pharmaceutical
consumption is assumed to be completely random, and utility is derived only from non‐
pharmaceutical consumption. For a given person, the probability distribution of non‐pharmaceutical
consumption is a function only of PBS concession eligibility. An illustration of these distributions
under both sets of prices is shown in Figure 2. In this example, the negative binomial distribution is
assumed to have α equal to 0.3. The discontinuity in the distribution under ‘general prices’ occurs at
the point where the safety net is invoked. In the distribution under ‘concession prices’, expenditure
is capped at a maximum of $274.40 per year. In the model being developed here, the effect of the
CSHC is to replace the ‘general price’ probability distribution of non‐pharmaceutical consumption
with the corresponding ‘concession price’ distribution.

13

Figure 2 Probability distributions for annual nonpharmaceutical consumption by PBS
concession status ($) (Annual Income = $40,000; α = 0.3)

Notes: This figure shows the hypothetical probability densities of annual non‐pharmaceutical consumption,
assuming general PBS prices (top panel) and concession prices (bottom panel) for a person with an annual
income of $40,000, assuming that the number of pharmaceuticals purchased is completely random and
follows a negative binomial distribution with a mean of 33.1 and overdispersion (α) equal to 0.3.
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The expected utility (with a CSHC card) for person i is:

E (U iC ) = ∫ U ( y i ) f ( y i )dy i
where y is non‐pharmaceutical consumption and f is the probability density function depicted in the
first panel of Figure 2 (or the corresponding distribution with different assumptions about
dispersion). The expected utility without a concession card is given by:

E (U ig ) = ∫ U ( y i ) g ( y i ) dy i
where g is the probability density function depicted in the second panel of Figure 2 (or the
corresponding distribution with different assumptions about dispersion).
A rational consumer is indifferent between possessing a CSHC or receiving a cash payment M when
the utility of each situation is equal:

∫U ( y

i

+ M ) g ( y i ) dy i = ∫ U ( y i ) f ( y i ) dy i

With ρ = 3, this becomes:

∫−

( y i + M )−2
2

y i− 2 f ( y i )
g ( y i ) dy i = ∫ −
dy i
2

With ρ = 3 and α = 0.3, M is evaluated to be $582.85. The actuarially fair insurance premium is the
difference in expected pharmaceutical expenditure (under concessional and general prices)
= E ( x C ) − E ( x G ) = $579.19. Thus the contribution to utility associated with risk reduction is a $3.66
per year, or 0.6% of the actuarially fair premium. Table 4 shows the results under various assumed
values for α and ρ. Even under assumptions of high dispersion of the PBS consumption distribution
(α = 1), high risk aversion (ρ=5) and completely random future health status, the value of the CHSC
to risk reduction is equal to only 2.4% of the actuarially fair premium value of the card. The actual
value is likely to be less than 1% and is hence negligible.
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Table 4 Utility value of CSHC to risk reduction (% of actuarially fair premium)

α

ρ

0 (Poisson)

0.3

1

1
3
5

0.0%
0.1%
0.2%

0.2%
0.6%
1.1%

0.5%
1.4%
2.4%

Source: author’s estimates (see text).

Moral Hazard and Dead Weight Loss
In this subsection, I consider the deadweight loss (DWL) associated with the PBS component of the
CSHC. DWL is the difference between the social cost of the CSHC and the minimum cash amount that
rational recipients would be willing to receive instead of the CSHC (assuming no utility gain from risk
avoidance). The key parameter which influences the results is the price elasticity of demand for
pharmaceuticals. Exploiting the CSHC policy change as a natural experiment, Siminski (2008)
estimated the price elasticity to be ‐0.1 for this population. This value is adopted here, with
sensitivity tested to other values.
For this exercise, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty, since uncertainty was addressed in the
previous section. In this model, consumers know their own health status with certainty for the
immediate accounting period (a calendar year). For this health status and a given price, there is a
unique quantity of pharmaceuticals consumed, which maximises the utility of a given consumer. This
consumer’s utility function depends on pharmaceutical consumption and non‐pharmaceutical
consumption. In summary, the approach taken is to derive the Hicksian compensating variation
(HCV) for such a consumer under a number of different scenarios (Hausman, 1981; Hicks, 1943). The
difference between the cost to government and the HCV is the DWL component of government
expenditure.
An important qualification to this treatment of dead weight loss is that it does not account for the
effect of price on health care expenditure in future periods or in different settings. If a higher
copayment leads to lower pharmaceutical consumption, this may have health consequences. This
may translate to more expensive treatment (for example emergency hospital treatment). Newhouse
(2006) reviews some recent evidence of this effect.
Consider a demand function for pharmaceuticals for person i. Let the quantity demanded and price
of pharmaceuticals be denoted xi and p, respectively. Let yi be the quantity demanded of the
composite of all other goods. The price of yi is normalised to 1 and is fixed. Income is denoted Ii.
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Assume that the demand function exhibits constant price and income elasticities. Under these
assumptions, The Marshallian demand function for pharmaceuticals can be written as:

xi = ci p α i I iδ i

(1)

where αi and δ i are the own‐price and income elasticities of demand for pharmaceuticals. ci is
individual specific and varies with health status and preferences for pharmaceutical versus non
pharmaceutical consumption, but these are assumed fixed for the accounting period and are known
with certainty.
Consider the following indirect utility function:
1−δ

− ci p α i +1 I i i
Vi ( p , I i ) =
+
αi +1 1− δi

(2)

This utility function corresponds to the demand function given in (1).
For a given utility ui, the corresponding expenditure function is derived by solving (2) for I, which is
now denoted ei(p,ui):
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎜
⎟
⎡
⎛
ci p α i +1 ⎞⎤ ⎝ 1−δ i ⎠
⎜
⎟
ei ( p, u i ) = ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜ u i +
⎥
α i + 1 ⎟⎠⎦⎥
⎝
⎣⎢

(3)

This is the minimum expenditure required to achieve utility ui, given the price p.
Consider the consequences of the abolition of the CSHC, which would change p from p0 to p1. The
compensation in income which would result in no change in utility given the price change is the
Hicksian Compensating Variation:

⎡

⎛

⎢⎣

⎝

HCV = ei ( p1 , u i ) − e( p 0 , u i ) = ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜⎜ u i +

α i +1

ci p1
αi +1

⎞⎤
⎟⎥
⎟
⎠⎥⎦

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟
⎜ 1−δ ⎟
i ⎠
⎝

⎡
⎛
c p
− ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜⎜ u i + i 0
αi +1
⎢⎣
⎝

α i +1

⎞⎤
⎟⎥
⎟
⎠⎥⎦

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟
⎜ 1−δ ⎟
i ⎠
⎝

(4)

Figure 3 shows the nominal price schedules for general and concessional consumers. For CHSC
holders in 2007, the first 56 PBS medications cost $4.90 each. Additional prescriptions are free. For
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non‐concession card holders, the first 43 prescriptions cost an estimated average of $24.56 each. 11
Additional prescriptions cost $4.90 each.

Figure 3 Nonlinear concessional and general price schedules, 2007
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Source: author’s estimates (see text and footnote 11).

The zero price after 56 prescriptions for concession card holders is a complication for the analysis.
Demand is undefined for a zero price in the constant elasticity demand function. However, it is
noted that the full cost of obtaining a prescription is not truly zero. There are non‐monetary (time)
costs associated with obtaining the medications, as well as (time and possible monetary) costs
associated with seeing a GP to obtain a prescription. This unmeasured cost might be small for
several reasons. GP care is free for most Australians, especially older people (for around 85% of
people aged 65 and over) (Abbott, 2005). For most medications, GPs can prescribe several courses
(up to six) at one time. They can also prescribe as many different types of medication at one time as
deemed appropriate. Furthermore, many people will have needed to see their GP in any case, for
reasons other than to obtain the prescription. Nevertheless, it is difficult to estimate the net value of
11

The co‐payment is capped at $30.70, but many medications are cheaper than this. The approach here

assumes that the ratio of the average payment to the maximum co‐payment is the same here as found for
earlier years by Siminski (2008).
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these costs. For the purpose of the illustration, this unmeasured cost is assumed to be $1 per
prescription. This is applied throughout the analysis, regardless of the cash price. Sensitivity of the
results is shown for alternative assumptions of $0.50 and $5.
Consider a consumer with α = ‐0.1 and δ =2. At t = 0, I = $40,000 and consumption of 30 units of
pharmaceuticals (x0=30). Substituting these values into (1), c is equal to 2.2 * 10‐8. Evaluating (2) at
these values results in a utility value of –2.5 * 10‐5. If the concession was removed (if p is increased
to p1), what would be the compensation required to maintain utility at the same level? Substituting
into (4), the compensating variation is evaluated to be $547. This consumer would be indifferent
between a health concession card and a cash benefit of $547.
Now consider the cost to government of the CSHC subsidy. At p=$25.56, x = 25.91 (from (1)), which
is the component of consumption not induced by the CSHC. For each of these 25.91 prescriptions,
the cost to government is equal to the difference between the concessional and general PBS prices,
which is $24.56 ‐ $4.90 = $19.66. An additional 30 – 25.91 = 4.09 prescriptions were induced by the
price change (moral hazard). In the absence of the CSHC, these would not have been consumed at
all. For these 4.09 prescriptions, the unit cost to government is greater than for each of the original
25.91. It is equal to the full government contribution of these drugs. For concession card holders this
is estimated to be $32. 12 In total, the cost to government of the CSHC for this consumer is equal to
25.91 * ($24.56‐$4.90) + 4.09 * 32 = $640. The DWL is the difference between HCV and government
cost = $94, or 15% of its cost.
The above example is a special case in a more general situation, characterised by a nonlinear price
schedule (Figure 3). The quantity demanded in the example above is to the left of the discontinuities
in both price schedules (x0<43). This quantity and the associated marginal price is labelled ‘a’ in
Figure 3. Quantity demanded and the marginal price in the counterfactual (concessional PBS prices)
is labelled ‘A’. ‘A’ will also always be to the left of the discontinuities, since the marginal price in the
general schedule is less than or equal to the concession price at all points in the price schedule. Let
‘Scenario 1’ refer to the situation where x0<43.
In Scenario 2 x0 is between the price discontinuities in the two price schedules (43 < x0 < 56
prescriptions in the year, labelled ‘b’). To calculate the corresponding HCV, it is necessary to
calculate utility under the counterfactual, which is the general price schedule. To do so, one must
confront the issues posed by the nonlinear price schedule. The optimal consumption level in the
12

This is equal to the total government contribution to PBS expenditure for concession card holders divided by

the number of prescriptions. Corresponding data are not available for the subset of CSHC cardholders.
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counterfactual (x1) might also lie between the discontinuities (denoted ‘B’). However, the consumer
may derive higher utility from a lower level of pharmaceutical consumption, x < 43, given the higher
price of each of the first 43 prescriptions.
Nonlinear price schedules pose considerable difficulties for the analysis of health care demand
(Keeler et al., 1977). However, under the assumptions outlined above, the consumer knows their
health status for the accounting period with certainty. This consumer can thus choose an optimal
level of consumption for the entire year at the beginning of the period. If they choose a point to the
left of the discontinuity (x1<43), the associated utility and HCV can be calculated using the same
techniques as Scenario 1, with price equal to $25.46.
If the optimum consumption level is to the right of the discontinuity (x1>43) they will face an
‘effective price’ of $5.90 per prescription. This ‘effective price’ is relevant to every prescription
considered for purchase during the year, since the consumer knows with certainty that an additional
prescription purchase will result in an additional expenditure of only $5.90 for the year. The actual
expenditure on pharmaceuticals, however, is greater than this, since the cost of pharmaceuticals is
$25.46 ‐ $5.90 higher for the first 43 prescriptions. The effect of this on consumption and utility is a
pure income effect, equal to a reduction in income equal to ($25.46 ‐ $5.90) * 43 prescriptions =
$845. Therefore, if the consumer chooses a consumption level greater than 43 prescriptions in the
counterfactual, the HCV is exactly equal to $845. To summarise, pharmaceutical consumption in the
counterfactual will be to the left of the price discontinuity (x1<43 prescriptions) if the associated
utility is greater than consumption above the discontinuity. In other words, if V(25.46, 40000) >
V(5.9, 40000‐845). The cost to government and DWL are calculated using the same methods as
Scenario 1.
To illustrate, take a consumer with the same parameters as in the first example, with the exception
that he consumes 50 units of pharmaceuticals (x0=50). From (1), c is equal to 3.7 * 10‐8. In the
counterfactual, utility is higher if the consumer purchases more than 43 prescriptions, as V(5.9,
40000‐845) = –2.57 * 10‐5 > V(25.46, 40000) =

–2.58 * 10‐5. The optimal x1 = 47.9. HCV is evaluated

to be $845. The cost to government of the CSHC for this consumer is equal to 47.9 * ($25.65‐$5.90) +
2.1 * 32 = $912. The DWL is $67, or just 7% of its cost to government.
This is a much smaller DWL than in Scenario 1. This is because the ‘effective price’ for concession
cardholders is the same as that of non‐card holders. The DWL is driven solely through an income
effect. However, if x0 is slightly lower (48 units), a much larger DWL is calculated. In this case, the
optimum consumption in the counterfactual is to the left of the price discontinuity (x<43). It is in fact
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41.5 prescriptions. The associated DWL is $143, or 14% of the cost to government. It is driven by
both income and price effects.
In Scenario 3, x0>56 (denoted ‘c’ in Figure 3). Consider a consumer with the same parameters as in
the first two scenarios, with the exception that he consumes 80 units of pharmaceuticals (x0=80).
Since x0>56, the nominal marginal price is assumed to be $1 per prescription as discussed above. To
account for the income effect associated with paying $5.90 for each of the first 56 prescriptions,
income is effectively reduced by ($5.90‐$1)*56 = $274.40. From (1), c is equal to 5.1 * 10‐8. In the
counterfactual, utility is maximised with x1= 65.1 prescriptions. HCV is evaluated to be $908. The
cost to government of the CSHC for this consumer is equal to $1367. The DWL is $459, or 34% of its
cost to government. If the assumed additional price of pharmaceuticals is increased to $5, the DWL
falls to 20% of the government cost. If it is assumed to be 50c, DWL falls increases to 39%.
Regardless of the choice of this parameter, the DWL is highest in Scenario 3.
The left panel of Table 5 summarises the results for the three illustrative consumption levels and the
assumed price loading per prescription (α and δ are fixed at –0.1 and 2, respectively). The value of
the card to the recipient clearly depends on the consumption level, with high consumers benefiting
more than low consumers. DWL also varies considerably at the different levels of consumption,
being highest for high consumers and lowest for those who consume 50 prescriptions. The
estimated HCV is not particularly sensitive to the assumed price loading due to unobserved costs.
However, the estimated DWL is sensitive to the price loading, particularly at the top of the
distribution (where pharmaceuticals are nominally free).
The right panel of Table 5 shows the average HCV and DWL across the entire distribution of
consumption. As before, the assumed value of the overdispersion parameter is 0.3. The preferred
estimate for the average HCV of the PBS component of the CSHC is $547. This estimate is not
particularly sensitive to the assumed overdispersion, nor to the assumed price loading. The DWL in
the right panel is the percentage of total government expenditure that is DWL (rather than the
average of DWL percentages across the distribution). In the preferred estimate, the DWL is equal
17.7% of government expenditure, but this is sensitive to the assumed overdispersion and price
loading.
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Table 5 HCV ($ per person per year) and DWL (% of government cost) by consumption
level and assumed price loading
Average across PBS consumption
distribution, overdispersion =

x0
HCV
Price loading
$0.50
$1
$5

30

50

80

0 (Poisson)

0.3

1

544
547
561

845
845
845

893
908
934

601
604
619

537
547
559

458
467
479

7.3%
7.3%
7.3%

39.3%
33.6%
19.7%

15.2%
14.4%
10.5%

21.1%
17.7%
11.8%

27.4%
22.9%
14.4%

DWL
price loading
$0.50
15.4%
$1
14.6%
$5
10.7%
Source: author’s estimates. See text.

Table 6 shows the sensitivity of results to the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals (δ is
fixed at 2 and the price loading is $1). The value of the card to the recipient does not vary greatly
with price elasticity. The cost to government of the card varies far more with this parameter. Thus
the share of government expenditure that is DWL also varies considerably.

Table 6 HCV ($ per person per year) and DWL (% of government cost) by price elasticity
of demand for pharmaceuticals
x0

Average across PBS consumption
distribution, overdispersion =
0 (Poisson)
0.3
1

HCV

30

50

80

α
0
‐0.1
‐0.3
DWL

599
547
458

845
845
769

948
908
481

659
604
506

583
547
424

497
467
356

‐1.5%
14.6%

7.3%
7.3%

7.5%
33.6%

‐1.2%
14.4%

1.9%
17.7%

3.5%
22.9%

‐0.3
36.5%
36.0%
Source: author’s estimates. See text.

78.2%

36.4%

48.3%

55.3%

α
0
‐0.1

Table 7 shows the sensitivity of results to the income elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals (α is
fixed at –0.1 and the price loading is $1). Neither the HCV nor the DWL is sensitive to income
elasticity.
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Table 7 HCV ($ per person per year) and DWL (% of government cost) by income
elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals
Average across PBS consumption
distribution, overdispersion=

x0
HCV

30

50

80

0 (Poisson)

0.3

1

541
547
558

845
845
845

918
908
890

597
604
618

543
547
554

467
467
469

0.5
15.5%
2.0%
2
14.6%
7.3%
5
12.8%
16.1%
Source: author’s estimates. See text.

30.9%
33.6%
38.3%

15.3%
14.4%
12.4%

17.0%
17.7%
18.7%

21.5%
22.9%
25.2%

δ
0.5
2
5
DWL

δ

The results are also insensitive to the assumed income of the consumer. For example, the HCV varies
by just $2 between I = $30,000 and I = $50,000. The corresponding variation in DWL is 0.4%.
To summarise, the average HCV of the PBS concession for CSHC holders is estimated to be $547. This
estimate is not greatly sensitive to variations in any of the assumed parameters. The deadweight loss
of the concession is estimated to equal 17.7% of the cost to government, but this is sensitive to the
assumed price elasticity of demand, the assumed price loading and the assumed overdispersion in
the distribution of consumption. The concession provides no insurance value over the HCV.
However, there is likely to be considerable variation between individuals around the average value
of the concession. This variation is primarily due to differences in PBS consumption levels, which
reflect preferences over pharmaceutical versus non‐pharmaceutical consumption. These, in turn,
will be partially a function of health status.

Externalities: NonRecipient Value
The discussion so far has focussed on the value of the benefit to the recipient. It is commonly argued
that health care markets are characterised by material externalities (such as the communal benefits
of immunisation and through the health of the labour force) and altruistic externalies (Hall, 2001;
Thurow, 1974). Altruistic externalities are associated with what Tobin (1970) refers to as ‘specific
egalitarianism’, people are generally less willing to tolerate inequality of access to health care than
to other commodities. Such externalities seem relevant to the market for pharmaceuticals.
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Both Smolensky et al. (1977) and Smeeding (1984) treat externalities from health care as pure public
goods. Whilst using different methods, both assume a constant utility value to donors (taxpayers)
associated with contributing taxes for re‐distribution through noncash health benefits. They do not
allow for the possibility of heterogenous levels of altruism. Nor do they account for externalities that
are not public goods. For example, formal health care may substitute for informal care being
provided by family members, who may thus be the ultimate beneficiaries of some health care
benefits. People who are employed in the health care industry or otherwise have a financial interest
in the industry are also obvious beneficiaries of non‐recipient benefits (Peskin, 1984). It is clear that
the methods proposed in distributional analyses to account for externalities are rather limited. But
this appears to be fundamental to understanding the public health care system.
However, this seems to be a minor issue in the case of the CSHC. CHSC holders have been found to
be quite unresponsive to price changes to pharmaceuticals. The policy change would have little if
any effect on their health. Thus externalities associated with their health status are likely to be small.
Similarly, tax‐payers perhaps gain less utility from the altruism of subsidising the consumption of this
population than that of poorer groups. In this paper, I do not account for any externalities from the
PBS concession for CSHC holders.

V The Distributional Impact
The distributional impact of the CSHC depends not only on its value to recipients, but also on several
other behavioural responses which it elicits. In particular, these include decisions over saving and
labour supply. The majority of this section is devoted to illustrative inter‐temporal models of the
possible effects of the CSHC on saving and labour supply. The source of finance for the CSHC and
general equilibrium issues are also briefly discussed.

Intertemporal Substitution
Officially, the 1999 increase in the income eligibility threshold for the CSHC was designed to
‘encourage people to save for their own retirement’ (Costello, 1998: 5). If CSHC eligibility does
influence saving decisions, this has implications for the distributional impact of the benefit. Assume
that utility is a function of consumption. If people are influenced by the CSHC to defer consumption
until retirement, their pre‐retirement utility would be reduced. I show that the policy change may
indeed induce some rational agents to save more for retirement. For others, however, the policy
change may have the opposite effect.
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Saving for retirement may be affected by one or more of three behavioural responses. People may
be influenced to change the balance between consumption and savings in the pre‐retirement
period. They may be influenced to change the timing of retirement. They may also be influenced to
change the quantity of labour supplied in the pre‐retirement period. To the extent that these
responses are induced by the income threshold for the CSHC, they are a consequence of the
interaction between private income and government benefits. The dotted line (labelled new system)
in Figure 4 shows this interaction for single people in 2007 (males aged 65 and over; females aged 63
and over) who meet the age pension assets and residency tests. The benefit structure includes the
average recipient value of the PBS concession as estimated in the previous section and the values in
Table 2, with the following qualifications. The Seniors Concession Allowance offsets a range of
concessions which age pensioners are entitled to (but CSHC holders are not). The value of these
concessions for age pensioners is assumed to equal the value of the Seniors Concession Allowance.
The One‐off Payment is excluded from the value of the CSHC. The value of additional bulk‐billing and
the Medicare Safety Net are not included. The solid red line (denoted ‘old system’) represents a
hypothetical 2007 benefit structure (for those who meet the age pension assets and residency tests)
if the CSHC was abolished. This is also the benefit structure that these same people would be subject
to if the 1999 reform had not occurred.
Figure 4 Annual Private Income and Benefit Income in Retirement, singles 2007*

Source: Table 2 and author’s estimate of the average recipient value of CSHC ($846.60). The schedule is
relevant for a person who meets Age Pension assets test and residency requirements.
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Consider a simple two‐period model (pre‐retirement: t=0 and retirement: t=1), where a consumer
maximises utility by choosing consumption in the two periods. The consumer’s private income in
period 0 is assumed exogenous, as is the structure of the benefit system, which depends on private
consumption in period 1. 13 Assume that the consumer’s utility function is additively separable over
the periods. Assume also that the real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, so that the
consumer’s problem is to maximise total utility:

max C0 U = U (C0 ) + U (C1 ) = U (C0 ) + U ( I 0 − C0 + B1 )

(5)

Where I0 represents private income in period 0, C represents consumption and B represents benefit
income. As in the previous section, assume that the utility function exhibits constant relative risk
aversion with ρ equal to 3, so that:

U=

C0 −2 ( I 0 − C0 + B1 ) −2
+
−2
−2

(5a)

First consider a hypothetical scenario, in which no benefit income is provided in retirement (B1=0).
Taking the partial derivative of U with respect to C and solving leads to an optimum consumption of
C0 = C1 = I0/2.
The situation is more complex if one considers the role of the benefit system. The effect of the CSHC
on saving differs considerably depending on I0. To illustrate this, I consider different levels of I0, each
chosen to illustrate a different type of effect. Consider the ‘old‐system’ benefit structure, described
above. The inter‐temporal budget constraint facing a consumer with I0=$82,000 is shown for this
scenario as a thick continuous line in Figure 5, and is denoted ‘old system’. Two other budget
constraints are also shown. A thin continuous line depicts the budget constraint in the hypothetical
case of no government benefit income. This constraint is identical to the first constraint at the points
where C1 is greater than or equal to $37,940.50. Below this, the no‐benefits line continues with the
same slope. The ‘old system’ line has a discontinuity at this point, which reflects the effect of CSHC
eligibility. It also has a more shallow gradient, which reflects the impact of the pension taper‐off
region, where the pension rate is contingent on private income. The third line (a red dotted line)
represents the actual 2007 benefit system, which incorporates the higher income eligibility

13

The benefit system actually depends on private income in period 1, rather than consumption. In this two‐

period model, all period 0 savings are converted into an annuity, which is received in full as income in period 1.
In a multi‐period model, this conversion of savings into income would depend on the expected number of
years of survival and the number of years prior to retirement.
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thresholds for the CSHC. It is labelled ‘new system’. This line has the same slope as ‘old system’ at all
points. The difference is that the discontinuity is lower in the period 0 consumption schedule, at C1=
$50,000.

Figure 5 Intertemporal Budget Constraints for Single Person with I0 = $82,000

Source: see text.

The effects of the CSHC on saving can now be examined within this framework. Consider the optimal
C0 which maximizes utility. The indifference curves with the optimal level of utility under the ‘old
system’ and the ‘new system’ are also shown in Figure 6, which is otherwise based on Figure 5.
Under the ‘old system’, utility is highest when C0 is equal to approximately $45,186. In the no
benefits system, we know from above that utility is maximized when C0 = $82,000/2 = $41,000.
Therefore, in this stylized example, the ‘old system’ reduced saving by $4,186 over the no benefit
scenario. Under the ‘new system’, utility is maximized with C0 approximately equal to $41,423, which
shows that the disincentive to saving is much smaller under the new system for I0 = $82,000. More
generally, similar results are found when $80,154 < I0 < $83,651.
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Figure 6 InterTemporal Budget Constraints and Indifference Curves For Single Person
with I0 = $82,000

Source: see text.

However, the new system can have the opposite effect at higher levels of I0 due to the budget
constraint discontinuity caused by CSHC eligibility. The discontinuity leads some rational decision
makers to corner‐solutions in the utility maximisation problem. This is shown in Figure 7 for I0 =
$105,000. Under the new system, utility is maximised at C0 = $55,000. In the old system, the optimal
C0 is $52,500. Thus the new system discourages saving at this level of private income. More
generally, corner solutions (which all correspond to decreased savings as a result of the new system)
are found for $100,700 < I0 < $108,722. The effect on saving is greatest at I0 = $108,722, with the
new system reducing optimal saving by around $4,400 as compared to the old system.
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Figure 7 Intertemporal budget constraint for single person with I0 = $105,000

Source: see text.

For people with $83,651 < I0 < $100,700, the policy change represents a pure wealth transfer in
Period 1. The rational course of behaviour in these circumstances is a small reduction in saving,
which allows the consumer to derive utility from the benefit in both periods. The indifference curves
corresponding to the old and new systems are shown in Figure 8. Under the assumptions that have
been adopted, the policy change would induce people in this income range to reduce savings by half
the value of the CSHC.
For I0 < $80,014 the optimal consumption levels are the same for the old and new systems. This is
illustrated in Figure 9 for I0 = $78,000. The optimal C0 = $43,500 under both the new and the old
system. Similarly, the savings of rational decision makers with I0 > $108,722 would not be altered by
the policy change.
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Figure 8 Intertemporal budget constraint for single person with I0 = $92,000

Source: see text.

Figure 9 Intertemporal budget constraint for single person with I0 = $78,000

Source: see text.
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The effect of the CSHC on saving is summarised in Figure 10 for Period 0 income between $76,000
and $114,000. The CSHC has no impact on saving outside of this income range. A positive value on
the vertical axis denotes an increase in saving associated with the CSHC, while a negative value
denotes a decrease in saving. It is clear from this graph that whilst the policy change does have a
substantial positive effect on saving within a given income range, this range is quite small. The policy
change has a negative effect on saving across a much large range of incomes. In this illustrative
model, it is not possible to estimate the net effect on saving. If, however, Period 0 income was
uniformly distributed, the net effect of the CSHC on saving would be negative. The average effect on
saving would be a decrease of $489 within the income range where saving is effected by the policy
change ($80,154 < I0 < $108,722) and as mentioned above, the effect is zero outside this range.

Figure 10 Effect of Policy Change on Saving by Period 0 Income

Source: Author’s estimates. See text.

It is emphasised that the above two‐period model is illustrative. The estimated savings effects at
various incomes may not correspond to optimal behaviour in continuous time. In principle, this
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model could be extended to a multi‐period model. Such a model would consider the effect of the
CSHC on saving throughout the life course. This has not been pursued. The reason for this is the level
of uncertainty around the effect of the policy change on the actual retirement benefits of people in
the future. The income eligibility threshold is not indexed to inflation and so its real value changes
every year. It is also subject to ad hoc change. For example, it was increased considerably in 2001.
Age pension policy also affects the income range of people who would benefit from the CSHC. For
example, the age pension taper rate was decreased from 50% to 40% in July 2000, substantially
increasing the income eligibility threshold for a part pension. As a result, the income range relevant
to the CSHC was reduced. To demonstrate the volatility of the relevance of the CSHC, consider its
income eligibility threshold for singles. In 1999, this threshold was 93% higher than the part‐rate age
pension eligibility threshold. In 2007, it was just 32% higher. Furthermore, PBS copayments for both
general and concessional patients are subject to change in every year and superannuation policies
are regularly adjusted, adding to uncertainty over the future value of the CSHC.
Models which incorporate uncertainty can of course be developed. However, such a model would
require assumptions on the probability distribution over future scenarios. Such an exercise would
not seem to be useful. For the same reasons regarding uncertainty, the material change brought
about by the CSHC policy change is unlikely to have influenced the savings decisions of people whose
retirement is distant. On the other hand, the policy change may have been more effective as a
symbol of the likely direction of future policy changes. The government has made it clear that it
intends to increase support for self‐funded retirees. Indeed, as discussed earlier, there have been a
number of separate reforms which all add to the generosity of benefits for self‐funded retirees. As a
result, the CSHC reforms may indeed have increased saving for retirement.
This discussion demonstrates the complexity of identifying the effect of the policy change on saving
decisions. It is even more difficult to incorporate this information in a cross‐sectional description of
the value of the CSHC for people of different ages and incomes, and this has not been attempted. It
is clear, however, that the CHSC may affect the consumption (and hence utility) of people
approaching retirement. The analysis suggests that it is possible for the policy change to have
affected saving in either direction. Thus it may have increased the utility of some people prior to
retirement, and decreased it for others.

Labour Supply
In this section, I briefly consider possible labour supply responses by people of pre‐retirement age
and people of retirement age (i.e. meeting age eligibility rules for the age pension and the CSHC),
respectively.
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In the inter‐temporal model presented above, the consumer maximises utility by choosing
consumption in period 0. It treats income in period 0 (and hence labour supply) as exogenous. A
complementary model might make the opposite assumptions. In this model, a consumer maximises
utility by choosing the quantity of hours supplied to the labour market in period 0. Consumption in
period 0 is treated as exogenous. Labour supply in period 1 is assumed to be zero, as in the previous
model. The budget constraint in such a model can be expressed in terms of leisure in period 0 and
consumption in period 1. Figure 11 shows two such budget constraints for C0 = $40,000 and a wage
of $30 per hour. The model abstracts from the taxation system for the purpose of the illustration. It
is clear that the shape of these constraints are the same as those in the original inter‐temporal
model above. Assuming that utility is diminishing in leisure (UL > 0, ULL < 0) this model has similar
implications for saving as the original model. To summarise, the effect of the policy change on saving
is ambiguous, regardless if the effect is through a shift in the timing of consumption, or through a
change in labour supply prior to retirement age.

Figure 11 Intertemporal Budget Constraints for Single Person with C0 = $40,000 and
wage = $30 per hour

Source: see text.

Finally, the policy change may affect labour supplied by people of retirement age. Consider a single
period model where utility is derived from consumption and leisure by people of retirement age.
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Assume that saving in previous periods is exogenous. Figure 12 shows two such budget constraints
for a single person with no savings and a wage of $30 per hour. Once again, the budget constraint
has the same shape as in previous models, implying that the effect on the labour supply of older
people may be positive for some and negative for others.

Figure 12 Budget Constraints for Single Person of Retirement Age with wage = $30 per
hour and no savings

Source: see text.

Taxation
A complete treatment of the distributional impact of the CSHC reform must also consider the source
of finance. It is necessary to construct a counterfactual which speculates on an alternative use of
funds. Whilst alternate forms of spending are possible, it is convenient to assume that the freed‐up
resources result in a tax‐cut. The incidence of a tax‐cut may fall partly with the consumer and partly
on producers, depending on the demand and supply elasticities of goods markets. There may also be
a labour supply response to the tax‐cut.
In practice, however, the financial implications of the CSHC reform are small. The total number of
CSHC holders in June 2006 was 310,663 (Department of Family and Community Services, 2006). It
was estimated in the previous sections that the annual cost to government per CSHC holder is
$846.60 (excluding the one off payments, the value of the concessional Medicare Safety Net
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threshold and any additional bulk‐billing). Thus the total annual cost of the CSHC is around $263m. In
comparison, Australian government income taxation revenue was $176bn in 2005‐06, of which
$6.5bn was generated from the Medicare Levy 14 . If the CSHC was abolished and the Medicare Levy
was adjusted accordingly, it would be reduced by 0.06 percentage points (to 1.44%). For a person
with average earnings ($43,100 p.a. at May 2006), such a tax cut would be worth $26 per year.

General equilibrium
To consider the full implications of withdrawing benefits and providing a tax cut, consideration must
be given to general equilibrium issues (see Piggott, 1987). To some degree, the prices of all goods
and services in the economy may change in response to a tax‐cut, and industrial restructuring may
be induced as a consequence. Similarly, on the expenditure side, government spending on health
care also has general equilibrium implications. A removal of government health insurance may have
effects on demand in the private health care industry, as well as the possibility of changes in demand
for other goods and services with, again, the possibility of industrial restructuring.
Of course these issues are much smaller for studies of small programs such as the CSHC than for
studies with broader scope. For this reason, some argue that studies of the ‘global’ distributional
impact of government are neither meaningful nor useful (Bird, 1980). In the case of the CSHC, the
behavioural responses with possible general equilibrium implications are the additional income and
pharmaceutical consumption of CSHC holders, changes to saving and/or labour supplied by people
prior to retirement, and the loss of disposable income to tax payers to finance the benefit. No
attempt has been made to model these general equilibrium effects.

VI Summary and Conclusion
This paper has estimated the value of the CSHC to recipients and considered its distributional
impact. Its main feature is a series of models which demonstrate the effects of moral hazard, risk
pooling and incentives to saving and labour supply. The treatment of the PBS concession is the first
to explicitly model the trade‐off between moral hazard and risk pooling for the utility value of an
Australian public health insurance scheme.

14

The Medicare Levy is a 1.5% levy on private taxable income. It was introduced to help fund the Medicare

system when it was introduced in 1984. However, it only finances 11% of total government health expenditure
(Australian Institute for Health and Welfare, 2007; Australian Government, 2007c).
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In 2007, the average value of the CSHC was estimated to be $847 per card holder plus a ‘one‐off’
cash payment of $500 and the unmeasured values of the Medicare Safety Net concessional
threshold and additional bulk‐billing. The largest and most difficult component to value is the PBS
concession. The PBS concession may induce additional consumption which leads to a dead weight
loss. It was shown that the additional utility value of the concession through eliminating risk is
negligible. The preferred estimate of the average value of the PBS concession to CSHC holders is
$547. This estimate is not particularly sensitive to the assumed parameters. Its average cost to
government was estimated to be $665 and so the dead weight loss is equal to 18% of the cost to
government. This is despite a relatively small price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals for this
population (‐0.1). Whilst the estimated dead weight loss is sensitive to the assumed parameters, it
was rarely less than 10%. Given that the dead weight loss may be substantial, a cash transfer may be
a more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, the concession has greater value for people
with higher PBS consumption. To the extent that higher PBS consumption reflects poorer health, the
concession is perhaps more equitable that the equivalent cash transfer. 15
An illustrative model was developed to demonstrate the effects of the CSHC on incentives to save
for retirement. The model demonstrates that whilst it may induce some people to save for
retirement, it may have the opposite effect on others. This issue is complicated, however, by rapidly
changing retirement income policies, including an increasingly generous provision of benefits to
‘self‐funded’ retirees. Similarly, it may have a positive effect on the labour supply of some people
both before and during the age of CSHC eligibility, but a negative effect on others.
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